Viridian Key Insights

        VIRIDIAN INSIGHTS

• YTD CAPITAL RAISES ARE UP IN THE U.S. BUT DOWN EVERYWHERE ELSE
  • The chart below breaks out worldwide capital raises for the first twelve weeks of every year since 2018.
  • After a good start to the year, YTD worldwide capital raises of $275.5M are now 40% below the same period in 2024.
  • Canada is down the most. The brown bar on 2024’s graph represents the $197M Canadian equity raised, which dropped to only $30.1M YTD in 2025.
  • The U.S. regained dominance, increasing from 40.2% of capital raised in 2024 to 82.1% in 2025. Total U.S. raises of $226.19M was up 22.6% from 2024.
  • All of the U.S. gains were in debt financing, represented by the light green bars on the graph. U.S. raises were up 161.7% from $73M in 2024 to $190M in 2025. Note that $130M of this was accounted for by raises of $100M for Chicago Atlantic and $30M for XS Financial.
  • U.S. equity raises (dark green bars)were down  68% from $112M in 2024 to $35M in 2025.
  • The bottom line is that the capital crunch is still very much in force, and debt has become the dominant source of cannabis capital worldwide.

• • OOPS! I DID IT AGAIN – PHARMACANN DEFAULT PART 2
    • Wow! That was fast! On 12/29/24, IIPR announced that Pharmacann was in default of its eleven leases. Then, on 1/31/25, IIPR announced an agreement to cure the defaults and halt lease payments on two of the eleven leases, subject to a few conditions. Then, on 3/14/24, IIPR announced that Pharmacann was back in default on all eleven leases. We do not remember any company going into, out of, and back into default in less than three months.
    • So what went wrong? Can Pharmacann’s cash flow or liquidity have changed so radically over less than three months? We doubt it. So what are the possibilities?
    • One of the critical conditions of the agreement between Pharmacann and IIPR was that Pharmacann needed to refinance its estimated $125M of 12% of senior secured notes of 6/30/25. Maybe the company was not able to get this done. We expected this to be a tough slog as the existing notes were offered at 70, indicating a belief that they had little possibility of a par payout. We thought that Pharmacann would probably have to provide a pretty hefty amount of equity kickers in terms of shares or warrants to convince bondholders to extend/refinance this debt.
    • Or perhaps the bondholders would only grant extensions if the company was able to extract better lease terms from IIPR? After all, the company only received annual rent reductions of about $2.6M-$2.8M in the agreement.
    • Or could it go the other way? Maybe the company is using the default as a lever to obtain concessions from the note holders. The argument would go something like this,” if you don’t grant us extensions on reasonable terms, we will lose our cultivation and processing facilities in New York, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. This is an extinction-level event that will make getting much recovery on your bonds doubtful. So get real!”
    • Still, another potential stumbling block was the requirement to obtain additional equity from Pharmacann’s owners. It is unknown how much was required by the IIPR settlement, but there is clearly a good money after bad problem here. Adding equity is simply priming the pump for the bonds to be made whole. We say that without any specific knowledge of the company’s financial statements, but we do know that when your bonds are trading at distressed levels and you are threatened with the loss of your key cultivation assets, it’s a difficult time to raise equity.
    • In the original Viridian analysis, we predicted a negotiated settlement. Any other outcome was reminiscent of the Cold War concept of MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD). For IIPR, failing to find a negotiated solution was a difficult pill to swallow as it would almost certainly have had to cut its dividend and face a potentially elongated and costly re-leasing program. For Pharmacann, the loss of the entire leased portfolio would have likely forced the company to liquidate.
    • Things keep getting stranger in Canna land!
  • 4^TH QUARTER RESULTS ARE IN, AND ANALYSTS ARE EXPECTING THE SAME SLOW GROWTH AND MARGIN CONTRACTION TO CONTINUE FOR THE FULL YEAR 2025
  • The table  below summarizes 4^th quarter earnings releases

• • • The first of the two charts below, reprinted from previous charts of the week, decomposes the percentage change in EBITDA from q4:23 to q4:24 into components of revenues and EBITDA margins. The second chart completes the same exercise for projected 2025 EBITDA vs 2024. For 2025, the outlook is for flat revenues and lower margins.

• CANNABIST’S BOLD DEBT RESTRUCTURING PLAN FEELS LIKE DEJA-VU
  • Cannabist’s announced debt restructuring plan looks eerily similar to the one that AYR executed at the beginning of 2024: The company gave up around 25% of its equity to extend debt maturities to 2028 with two six-month extensions. Holders of existing notes will receive dollar-for-dollar exchanges into similar coupons with longer maturities. Holders who committed to the plan early will also receive a pro-rata share of a $1.5M early consent fee.
  • Like AYR, the company did not extinguish any debt in the plan. It will remain arguably overleveraged, but the stakes are survival and this plan gives the company significant time to improve its profitability and make other operating and capital structure moves.
  • We applaud Cannabis management for making an early move to address a worrisome upcoming series of debt maturities. We had ranked the company’s situation as one of the most perilous (along with AYR)
  • Our calculations show that the completion of the restructuring should have had a dramatic impact on the stock. In fact, we think it could go up by a factor of 2.6x to around $.13 per share! Total liabilities to market cap would improve from 26.9x to 10.7x, still a stressed credit but not disastrous. So far, the equity market has not realized the value of the 2-3 year reprieve.
• GAUGING THE RISK OF THE 2026 DEBT MATURITY BUBBLE
  • Much has been made of the upcoming wave of cannabis debt maturities in 2026. The sheer size is undoubtedly intimidating. The companies pictured on the graph below collectively have about $2.6B of debt maturing in 2026. (IAnthus maturities are actually in 6/27, but close enough!). Putting that figure into perspective, $2.6B is greater than the total capital raised for the cultivation & retail sector for any year since 2018 except for 2021.
  • Viridian is generally more constructive about the issue than most other industry observers. We observe that in the high-yield bond market, it is virtually never the case that debt is paid off in cash. It is generally refinanced, OR the company is forced to restructure. Obviously, given the lack of prepack bankruptcy (or any bankruptcy for that matter), restructuring is rightfully a prospect to be feared in cannabis.
  • So, how do we gauge the risk of something going wrong in 2026? Refinancing risk is a peculiar mixture of market psychology and financial realities.
  • Successful completion of the Cannabist plan discussed above should have a positive impact on the market psychology regarding the other troublesome maturities. However, that effect has been clouded by overall market turmoil. And lest we seem Pollyannaish, we do recognize that several companies are looking increasingly troublesome. The graph below shows three relevant data points:
    • The green bars show the 3/21/25 market-implied asset coverage of total liabilities. We arrive at this by looking at the equity as a call option on the asset value of the firm, with a strike price of its liabilities, and with assumed maturities (2026) as well as volatility assumptions (40%) and risk-free rate (4.25%). This gives us all of the elements of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula except for the current asset value. By iterating the solution of the BS model, we can find the market’s assumption for asset value. The importance of this data point should be obvious. For companies with under 1x asset coverage of liabilities, debt providers are genuinely making an equity bet. They do not have adequate asset value coverage to fall back upon.
    • The purple line represents the Viridian Capital credit ranking, which takes into account four key credit factors: Liquidity, Leverage, Profitability, and Size. Refinancing will be more difficult for weaker credits (higher numbers). Companies with ranks of under 16 are in the top half of the Viridian-ranked universe of credits.
    • The red line represents the multiple of market cap that 2026 debt maturities represent. Clearly, the larger the debt maturities relative to the market cap, the more difficult we would expect refinancing to be. The seven companies from ITHUF to the right side of this graph (except Cannabist) represent high risk. They have less than 1x asset value coverage, poor Viridian Credit Ranks, and maturing debt that is a multiple of market cap. Companies in this position represent approximately $867M of the maturing debt. Conversely, the five companies on the left-hand side of the graph represent low refinancing risk. They have solid asset coverage, strong Viridian Credit Ranks, and maturing debt that is less than 1x market cap. These companies represent $1.6B of the $2.6B total (62%), and we believe they should all be able to refinance their maturities without undue pain.
    • AYR (AYR.A: CSE) took a turn for the worse on all three indicators this week after a disappointing earnings release. The company’s Viridian Credit Rank worsened from #16 to #21, Its asset coverage declined to .60x, and its market fell to the point where its 2026 debt maturities now represent over 12 times the market cap. The announced Cannabist deal looks surprisingly like the one AYR did at the beginning of 2024. Can AYR turn around and do it again? With the debt trading at significant discounts and the equity trading like an out-of-the-money option, it’s going to take something big to pull AYR out of the fire. Selling AYR’s four stores in Illinois is not likely to be sufficient to make much difference. We would not be surprised if AYR attempted to sell its Virginia assets, which are probably worth more than the Illinois properties, but they may still not be enough to make much progress on the looming debt maturities.

• FOUR KEY GRAPHS THAT SEEK TO MAP THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE MSOs BASED ON THEIR VALUATION, LEVERAGE, AND LIQUIDITY
  • The first two graphs present different versions of EV/EBITDA on the vertical axis and Debt/EBITDA on the horizontal axis.
  • The first graph presents our latest view of the most appropriate valuation and financial statement-based leverage metrics: Adjusted EV / 2025 EBITDAR and Adjusted net debt / 2025 EBITDAR. In calculating Adjusted Net Debt, we make several key assumptions: 1) Leases that are included on the balance sheet are considered debt. We view most leases in the cannabis space as equivalents to equipment loans or mortgage loans. While it is true that a lease default does not necessarily trigger a cascade of events leading to bankruptcy, the distinction is often meaningless in cannabis due to the mission-critical nature of many long-term leases and the absence of bankruptcy protection in cannabis. 2) We consider any accrued taxes (including uncertain tax liability accounts listed as long-term liabilities) in excess of the most recent quarterly tax expense to be debt. Our calculation of enterprise value is now market cap plus debt plus leases plus tax debt minus cash. We now use EBITDAR rather than EBITDA since lease expense is taken out prior to EBITDA.
  • The second graph utilizes EBITDA and employs the traditional calculations of both debt and enterprise values, leaving out leases and taxes.
  • Our adoption of new metrics tends to make the companies look less cheap and more leveraged.
  • Surprisingly, nine of the companies on the enhanced metric chart are still above 3x leverage, which we have identified as the boundary of sustainability in a 280e environment. Four companies now exceed 4x leverage, which we believe will be close to the maximum sustainable post 280e.
  • Jushi and TerrAscend appear as leverage outliers using the new metrics relative to AYR and Cannabist, which seemed more leveraged using standard measures.
  • TerrAscend and, particularly, Glass House are valuation outliers. We have been positive on Glass House for quite a while, but the multiple spread to the nearest competitor is straining our resolve. We note GLASF’s $25M at the market equity issuance facility as another factor likely to restrain price appreciation.

• The third graph looks at leverage through the lens of total liabilities to market cap. We believe this is the single best measure of leverage because it is a direct reflection of the market’s assessment of the value of a company’s assets in excess of its liabilities and is sensitive to changes in market perception of a company’s future.
  • On the bottom left are companies with Adj EV/2025 EBITDAR of under 6x and total liabilities to market cap under 2x. The group includes Vext, GTI, and Trulieve. Companies in this quadrant are right to consider stock repurchases or using cash in acquisitions. They can afford some additional debt and can take advantage of the ongoing dislocation in equity prices.
  • In the middle, between 2x and 5x total liabilities/market cap, we see Verano, Cresco, and MariMed. Verano and Cresco both have significant 2026 maturities, but we do not believe either is likely to have difficulties refinancing their debt.
  • On the right lies Jushi and Ascend, both between 6x and 10x. a range that signals stress if not distress.
  • AYR, 4Front, Cannabist, and Schwazze are now off the chart to the right, signaling profound credit risk. Our recent work using option modeling of equity prices showed that the market believes each of these companies has significantly less asset value than liabilities.

• • The fourth graph introduces the free cash flow adjusted current ratio liquidity measure into the mix. Companies with less than 1x on this measure will likely have to raise capital next year.
  • On the top left, we find companies with adequate liquidity and low market leverage, including both GTI and Planet 13.
  • Companies in the lower middle-to-right generally have constrained liquidity and high leverage, a potentially dangerous combination in a capital-constrained environment. Five, including Schwazze, Cannabist, Ascend, MariMed, and 4Front These companies are high-risk with both high market leverage and low liquidity.

• VALUATION METRICS SUGGEST STRONG DOUBT REGARDING RESCHEDULING AND OTHER CANNABIS REGULATORY REFORM
  • The chart below shows that cannabis companies are trading at historically low valuation metrics – significantly lower than before S3 was a gleam in HHS’s eyes. Granted, there are a host of industry-specific problems that go beyond regulatory reform: slowing growth, wholesale pricing pressure, a weary consumer, etc.
  • We continue to believe that at current levels, U.S. MSOs have enormous upside potential. We are not pollyannish about the issues and do realize the industry has a number of deep-seated problems, like competition with hemp, wholesale price compression, and dependence on new markets for growth. Moreover, it may take some political catalysts to achieve significant gains, and the market is beyond worrying about timing and is concerned that these reforms may never transpire. The graph below shows the multiples reached after a number of past legislative/regulatory events. It makes clear that a doubling of prices is a reasonable possibility.
  • However, it is increasingly important to focus on building a diversified portfolio of companies that can make it without help from Washington because it’s anyone’s guess when that will arrive. Focus on the top 10 companies in our credit rankings. There ARE investable companies besides GTI. Put them in your portfolio and follow the total liabilities to market cap indicator, as well as the credit tracker rankings.

• • MSO STOCK LIQUIDITY REBOUNDS FROM ALL-TIME LOWS
    • The average daily dollar volume of $7M for the week ending 3/21/25 is the lowest since we began tracking this series at the end of 2023.
    • The Days to Trade Market Cap (DTTMC) series depicts the number of days it would take to trade the market cap of a stock or group of stocks. The current DTTMC of 2061 is a significant deterioration from last week’s 1084 and represents the worst liquidity we have measured. It implies that an investor who acquired a 5% position in the stock, assuming he wanted to be less than 25% of the average daily dollar volume, would require 412 days to trade out of his position.
    • The tremendous illiquidity prevents institutional capital from entering the cannabis stock market. Moreover, uplisting to the TSX has only had minor impacts on the liquidity of Curaleaf and TerrAscend. This is another example of the importance of SAFER. With rescheduling and SAFER we believe there is a pathway to uplistings to senior exchanges like Nasdaq. It will take more than SAFER. However, internal improvements at the company level will also be critical. Most of the larger MSOs have moved to U.S. GAAP accounting and are filing 10Qs and !0Ks, which is a good step. Other steps include the elimination of dual-class share structures and improvement in corporate governance standards.
    • Volumes will undoubtedly pick up upon rescheduling and passage of SAFER, but it will likely require uplisting to senior exchanges to make cannabis stocks genuinely investable.

• • GIVING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE
    • The chart below shows our updated 3/21/25 credit rankings for 31 U.S. cannabis companies. The number below the ticker symbol indicates the change in credit ranking since last week. A negative number suggests credit deterioration, while a positive number indicates improvement.
    • The blue squares show the offered-side trading yields for each Company. Cannabist yields initially dropped significantly to the mid-20% range with the announcement of the company’s restructuring plan but have now drifted back into the upper 20s. AYR 13s of 26 are offered in small size at 70 for a yield in the upper 30s, indicating a market belief that a restructuring rather than a refinancing is the base case assumption.