VIRIDIAN INSIGHTS

• CURALEAF JUMPS INTO THE DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER HEMP-DERIVED THC MARKET.
  • In a move with far-ranging implications, Curaleaf (CURA: TSX)(CURLF: OTCQX) announced the launch of an all-new line of hemp-derived THC products under the company’s Select and Zero Proof brands.
  • Products will be available beginning June 26 on the company’s new online storefront.
  • The products will be available directly to consumers via TheHempCompany.com, Curaleaf’s new home for all fully Farm Bill-compliant hemp-derived products.
  • Curaleaf is partnering with DoorDash for on-demand delivery, initially in F.L., TX, IL, NJ, and M.N. Products will be available for order from Curaleaf’s website in 25 states.
  • Initial products include gummies and drinks, areas where less than .3% THC by dry weight restrictions allow for products that are not “always completely non-intoxicating,” according to the FAQ on the company’s website.
  • Curaleaf is looking to address a potentially enormous market that we are surprised other MSOs have not jumped into. After all, if a state passes legislation that shuts down these products, Curaleaf will just quit shipping to that state.
  • The long-term goal is obviously to set up a distribution channel that will be available for other THC products when allowed.
  • Who will follow Curaleaf’s lead?
• WHO WILL BE NEXT TO ANNOUNCE A STOCK BUYBACK?
  • On June 17, 2024, Verano Holdings (VRNO: CBOE)(VRNOF: OTCQX) announced that its Board had authorized it to repurchase up to $50M of its common shares over the next year.
  • Verano had $193M of cash as of its March qtr end balance sheet and a total market cap of approximately $1.1B, so the repurchased program is expected to have negligible impact on its balance sheet or credit metrics.
  • The buyback makes abundant sense. Despite achieving a #4 credit ranking on the Viridian Credit Tracker model, Verano’s stock has received little love. It is down nearly 40% over the last month and is only up about 8% since the HHS rescheculing announcement on August 30, 2023.
  • Trulieve and Cresco Labs both look like good candidates for share repurchases. Both have 1) E.V./2024 EBITDA multiples, 2) generally good liquidity, and 3) solid credit quality according to the Viridian credit model.
• THE RIGHT TIME TO SELL IS WHEN EVERYONE ELSE IS BUYING
  • On June 17, 2024, Cannabis Company (CBST: Cboe)(CBSTF: OTCQX) announced it was swimming against the tide and selling out of Florida, just as other MSOs struggle to build their Florida positions in anticipation of the State going rec.
  • Assets for sale include 14 dispensaries, three cultivation and manufacturing facilities, and its medical cannabis license.
  • Cannabist has not done well in the Sunshine State, losing approximately $4.8M on around $6M in revenues in the most recent quarter. The company blames the losses on the fact that its “asset base is not commercially optimized with more cultivation capacity than our retail locations require.”
  • One thing is for sure: the company needs the cash. With total liabilities to market cap of 9.1x and net adjusted debt/ 2024 EBITDA of 7.58x, Cannabist stands out as an outlier on our leverage graphs. Its 23/30 credit ranking in the Viridian Credit Tracker model tells a similar story of a company on the borderline of distress.
  • Against this backdrop, we applaud the company’s decision to take some chips off the table, and we sincerely hope that some of the proceeds will be earmarked for de-leveraging.
  • Cannabist said that it has $2.75M in escrow from “multiple transactions,” but further details of the divestiture transactions were not released.

• THE CANSORTIUM/RIV MERGER CREATES A TOP-TEN CANNABIS CREDIT
  • The announced merger with RIV Capital enhances Cansortium’s credit profile, and the Viridian Credit Tracker model ranking improves from #18 to #8,
  • Cansortium’s net cash position goes from -$60.7M to $5.1M, dramatically improving its Viridian Capital Liquidity ranking from #23/30 to #9/30.
  • Leverage is also significantly reduced, predominantly from the conversion of $175M of Hawthorne debt into Cansortium equity. The conversion also demonstrates support from Hawthorne’s parent, Scotts Miracle Grow.
  • The combined company will jump to a #10 size ranking compared to the t#21 ranking Cansortium had prior to the announcement.
  • Cansortium is “all in” in Florida and the transaction significantly improves the combined company’s ability to attack the potential conversion to rec of the state.
  • The deal risk arb spread now stands at over 59%, which is quite wide but probably appropriate for this stage of the process with a difficult-to-estimate closing date and a number of hurdles to complete. We will be ranking the proforma combined company going forward with the proviso that Cansortium’s credit ranking will fall precipitously if the deal is canceled.
• LESS RECOGNIZED BENEFITS OF RESCHEDULING: HIGHER SUSTAINABLE DEBT LOADS AND INTERNALLY FUNDABLE GROWTH
  • Key takeaways from the chart below
    • The analysis assumes a hypothetical company with $1 of sales, 50% gross margins, and 30% EBITDA margins.
    • The analysis shows that the hypothetical company experiences greater than 100% effective tax rates despite the allocation of 80% of depreciation expense and 25% of SG&A expense to COGS. The same company would have a combined state and federal effective tax rate of 27.32% without 280e
    • Debt levels of 3x EBITDA are not sustainable in a 280e world, but not because interest coverage is inadequate. Using 15% average debt, we get 2.14x EBITDA/Interest coverage. The issue is the debt payback period. We calculate a debt payback of over 14 years with the given assumptions, which no regular cannabis lenders (except sales leaseback providers) will accept. S3 reduces the payback period to a more acceptable 6.11 years.
    • If we assume ten-year payback periods, the removal of 280e would increase sustainable debt loads from 2.65x Debt/EBITDA to 3.91x.
    • The bottom set of numbers shows the impact 280e has on internally fundable growth. In this analysis, we utilize the capital/sales ratio of 1.54x, which we discussed in the Viridian Chart of the Week. With 280e and 3x debt, companies can only internally fund 4.2% sales growth. The elimination of 280e more than doubles internally fundable growth to 9.6%

• The DOJ has signed off on S3, and the 60-day public comment period has commenced. Why does the equity market not care?
  • Investors are tired and have been spoofed too many times. When someone says, “It could take up to a year…” Cannabis investors immediately immediately think, “It’s never going to happen.” It now seems to us that it is overwhelmingly likely to happen, and the critical question is whether it will really happen as quickly as advertised.
  • Institutional investors who have avoided the space would rather miss part of the rally than jump in for another ride like the last two years. Talking to investors, rating agencies, and other constituents, we find deep distrust for administrative actions like rescheduling. It is ironic that the very lack of congressional involvement that makes S3 likely to happen also imbues it with an aura of impermanence. Like the Cole memo, the fear is that a new administration may delay implementation or even reverse course.
  • Many details still need to be worked out, and investors still question how the State programs, the FDA, and Big Pharma will interact in an S3 world. Widely differing opinions exist on when S3 will actually become effective.
  • S3 could potentially have some perverse results. The extra funds might be competed away in misplaced attempts to gain market share. Also, the additional cash could foster capacity additions that hasten oversupply and commodity price declines.
  • We generally give little credence to claims that the DEA and FDA will become more rigorous in enforcing federal laws requiring S3 products to be approved by the FDA. Our position is based on two words: politics and money. Rescheduling is only coming to fruition because Biden is desperate for youth votes, and his DOJ is unlikely to support a new crackdown on state-licensed cannabis programs that it didn’t do while cannabis was S1. It is unlikely to undertake actions detrimental to tax-paying state-based businesses.
  • Still, despite the uncertain timing, regulatory implementation, etc., our view is that the various regulatory, judicial, and legislative tracks for cannabis industry reforms are mutually reinforcing. We have never seen so many potential upside catalysts in any other industry. We still view a doubling in price levels as reasonably achievable.

• VALUATION, LEVERAGE, AND LIQUIDITY
  • The two graphs below show the Enterprise value to 2024 EBITDA multiples against two leverage measures. In the first graph, we have calculated an Adjusted Net Debt/ 2024 EBITDA figure by adding any accrued taxes over 90 days of tax expense to debt before subtracting cash to arrive at Adjusted Net Debt. We would expect any regular company to have accrued taxes equal to their last quarterly tax expense and consider that a standard working capital item. Several companies on the chart have far greater than 90 days of accrued taxes, and we consider the excess to be debt. Verano’s excess tax liabilities equal nearly 40% of its debt. Other companies with relatively high imputed tax debt include Curaleaf (CURA: CSE), 4Front (FFNT: CSE), and Terrascend (TSND: TSX). We have adjusted our accrued tax liabilities for comparability by adding back the tax liabilities that Trulieve, TerrAscend, and AYR moved into long-term liability accounts.
  • The first graph shows that twelve of the eighteen companies have net debt/ 2024 EBITDA over 3x, which we view as the cutoff of sustainability in a 280e world. We view 4x as sustainable in a post-280e environment, and nine companies are now over that threshold. This week, we included Cansortium, proforma for the merger with RIV. We analyze the credit quality of the combination further below in our credit modeling results but suffice it to say the graphs presented here make a case for significant uprating.
  • The second graph looks at leverage through the lens of total liabilities to market cap. This measure separates the companies into four groups:
    • On the bottom left are companies with low valuation multiples but also low market leverage.   The group includes Verano, Trulieve, Cresco, and MariMed. The other three show that the market is not yet willing to fully sign on to the Florida rec story.
    • In the middle, between 2x and 4x total liabilities/market cap, we see 4Front, Ascend, AYR, Goodness Growth, and Jushi. Each of these has more than 4x debt/ EBITDA, which is borderline in terms of sustainability, even in a non-280e world. However, each also has significant upside catalysts that could mitigate or exacerbate the excess leverage. FFNT is ramping up production at its mammoth Illinois cultivation facility. Ascend has a $275M term loan maturing in August 2025 that will need to be extended or refinanced. This loan is 110% of the company’s market cap, which is higher than the percentage of debt maturities that AYR restructured at the end of 2023. Jushi is levered to potential adult rec developments in Pennsylvania and Virginia.
    • On the right lie Cannabist and Shwazze. The high level of market leverage tells us that the market questions whether they can discharge their liabilities without significantly dilutive actions, doubts also shown by their 21/30 and 20/30 positioning in our weekly credit ranking. Cannabist has seen the writing on the wall: to levered to issue equity or debt, its only option was asset sales, and its exit from Florida was a recognition of this.
    • At the top left are companies with high valuation metrics and low leverage. These companies should look to do an equity issuance depending on their positioning in the liquidity graph below.
  • The third graph introduces the free cash flow adjusted current ratio liquidity measure into the mix. Companies with less than 1x on this measure will likely have to raise capital next year. Surprisingly, eight of the companies fall into this bucket. This graph also breaks the sector into three distinct groupings. The bottom left group has low leverage but also modest liquidity. Some of the companies, including Verano, MariMed, and Cresco, have sufficient but not comfortable levels of liquidity, while others, including Curaleaf, TerrAscend, and Glass House, are below the critical 1x liquidity line. Companies on the lower right generally have constrained liquidity and high leverage, a potentially dangerous combination in a capital-constrained environment. Shwazze bears particular attention. The company has just changed auditors and has announced that it will be late in filing its q1 reports. Moreover, the company has $29M of debt maturing in February 2025, and progress toward refinancing this debt should be watched closely.
  • Looking at leverage in two ways and having a comprehensive measure of liquidity can give investors a good idea of possible scenarios for today’s overleveraged companies.

• • • CANNABIS STOCK LIQUIDITY HITS NEW LOWS
      • The average daily dollar volume of $14M was the lowest of the year.
      • The Days to Trade Market Cap (DTTMC) series depicts the number of days it would take to trade the market cap of a stock or group of stocks. The weekly reading on 6/21/24 of 1013 days was the worst since prior to 2023. A 1013 DTTMC implies that an investor who acquired a 5% position in the stock, assuming he wanted to be less than 25% of the average daily dollar volume, would require 203 days to trade out of his position. The age-old chicken and egg question: are there no institutional investors because market liquidity is so low, or is market liquidity so low because there are no institutional investors?
      • We are firmly in the grip of the summer doldrums. Perhaps the presidential debates this week will kick up some trading volume?

• GIVING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE
  • The chart below shows our updated 6/21/24 credit rankings for the 30 U.S. cannabis companies with over $5M market cap. The number below the ticker symbol indicates the change in credit ranking since last week, where a negative number suggests credit deterioration, while a positive indicates improvement.
  • The blue squares show the offered-side trading yields for each company. Trading yields have declined significantly since the HHS rescheduling announcement.
  • There were several big movers this week, most notably Body & Mind (BAMM: CSE), which deteriorated by nine ranking notches to #28/30 based on its newly released April financials. We think this movement is overstated as we consider the company to be a better credit than Acreage, Tilt, Gold Flora, or Red White and Bloom, all of which currently score better. The drivers of the ranking deterioration are severalfold. Bamm’s liquidity has been somewhat shaky, with a current ratio of .49x last quarter and a decline of .46x this quarter. More importantly, the company’s cash from operations swung sharply from $1.8M to -$1.7M this quarter. That drove our annualized free cash flow to .17x, producing a 28/30 liquidity ranking. Measures of leverage were virtually all worse: Total liabilities to market cap deteriorated from 4.3x to 5.2x; Liabilities to Assets deteriorated from 1.5x to 1.7x, and annualized funds from operation/ total liabilities swung to #22/30 from #3/30. Together, they pushed the Viridian leverage indicator to #25/30 from #18/30.